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ABSTRACT 
We use a long-term electricity market equilibrium model to assess the impact of variable price 
products for household electricity customers. The analysed product structures resemble a 
rebate provided to customers within a field experiment in Southern Denmark. The developed 
model provides a clearer picture of what to expect from household demand response under 
spot pricing schemes as compared and simplified product schemes; it also prepares for 
interpreting the field experiment results. Using preliminary assumptions we estimate both 
short-term and long-term welfare effects of a shift of customers to an ideal spot pricing 
scheme and to the simplified rebate product. 
KEYWORDS 
Dynamic electricity prices, demand response, household consumers, partial equilibrium 
model, field study. 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Danish energy policy aims at a fossil-free electricity supply in 2035 as a stepping stone 
towards a fossil-free energy system in 2050 [1]. It is widely agreed that wind energy is going 
to play a major role in this future energy system. In 2020 electricity generation from wind 
energy should make up 50% of annual consumption [2]. The share was at 39.1% already by 
2013 [3]. 
 
Large-scale development of intermittent electricity production from renewable sources also 
requires sufficient flexible capacity to maintain a stable system. With increasing volumes of 
wind energy new options beyond the traditional flexibility of power producers are required. 
To address the evolving flexibility challenge the Danish electricity system operator, amongst 
several other initiatives, aims at a better utilisation of demand-side flexibility [4]. In support 
of such a development Danish government in 2013 issued a smart grid strategy for the time 
until 2020 [5].  
 
Although the demand side is just one flexibility option amongst others [6], response from 
both traditional and new loads (e.g. heat pumps and electric vehicles) will play an 
increasingly important role in the time to come. Some congestion can only be reliably solved 
by direct and automatic control of loads, while manual response at times may relieve some of 
the pressure as well [7]. Household consumers could contribute with both: their new loads for 
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heating and transport that can be actively managed, and manual response with a share of their 
conventional demand.  
 
If demand response is to become significant at household level, we need to know, though, 
how to make customers adopt flexible technologies and behaviour, and evaluate the costs and 
benefits this may bring. A large-scale field study has been initialised in Southern Denmark to 
investigate these questions. The study utilises load-shift incentives based on a rebate product. 
A unique feature of the ongoing study is, furthermore, that the product structures are analysed 
with non-monetary incentives as well. Response and benefits depend on the design of the 
incentives (i.e. tariff structures, environmental benefits as well as other non-monetary 
incentives), and until the field experiment is finished the actual response from customers is 
unknown. In this paper we prepare a model framework and test it on preliminary assumptions. 
 
To prepare for interpreting the results and to get a clearer picture of what to expect from 
household demand response, it is necessary to translate responses to the given incentives into 
benefits. One of the drivers that need to be examined – although certainly not the only one – 
is the economic incentive. We use a simple long-term electricity market equilibrium model 
for that purpose, and we compare situations with and without the new incentive structures. On 
the way to understanding the effects of demand response on the system and on individual 
households, a plain economic cost-benefit analysis – as presented here – is an important first 
step. Eventually, harvesting any economic benefits also relies on removing various barriers 
within the regulatory framework [8]. 
Previous research 
Cost-benefit analysis of demand response have been conducted in various studies and within 
different market and regulatory contexts (for an overview see Conchado and Linares [9]). 
Research in this field takes different directions: While some explain the effects based on 
economic theory, others take more of a technical approach and optimise demand response 
actions under a given set of prices and, mostly technical, constraints. As we intend to assess 
long-term economic impacts it is useful to distinguish previously applied approaches 
according to the way they model market impacts of demand response. In the following we 
describe three levels of market impact.  
 
The first level is a price-taker approach: under a given set of prices, find the optimal response, 
based on either price-elasticities or subject to a set of constraints on timing, volume etc., 
assuming the response has no impact on prices. The second level, acknowledges the price 
impact of the optimal response. It can be referred to as the short-run equilibrium approach: 
find the optimal response given a particular market structure, where structure first of all refers 
to marginal costs of supply and marginal benefits of demand. At the second level, supply 
capacities are static, and only their marginal costs are taken into account. The third level 
integrates fixed costs as well and may be referred to as the long-term equilibrium approach: 
given the optimal response in short-term equilibrium, find the optimal level of capacity. The 
equilibrium in both of the last two approaches typically is only partial, i.e. related to the 
electricity market only. 
 
The price-taker approach is used in a number of demand response analyses [10–16]. It is 
sometimes based on historical prices or uses models calibrated with historical prices. When 
focus is on a single project or individual actors’ benefits this approach is particularly useful. It 
may still be useful to analyse system-wide developments or larger groups of actors; in such a 
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case the validity of the results should be critically evaluated as analysed behaviour may affect 
price levels. 
 
A short-term equilibrium approach provides a bit more insight into the market dynamics of 
demand response. Focus typically lies on social welfare impacts. An intuitive outcome often 
confirmed in such models is the observation of reduced price spikes, and potentially lower 
prices in general, caused by a more efficient integration of the demand side. Short-term 
focussed analyses have been carried out, for instance, with a focus on real-time or day-ahead 
pricing [10,17–20] as well as other incentive-based response schemes [21]. 
 
To fully evaluate the impact of policies or regulatory decisions long-term effects should be 
taken into account. For that reason the short-term approach can be accompanied by an 
analysis of the long-term equilibrium [22–24]. One could argue that this is the soundest 
approach from a welfare-economic point of view. One particular formal framework by 
Borenstein and Holland [25] has been applied several times in different variations, showing 
how real-time pricing and resulting response of elastic demand generates significant benefits 
even with limited elasticities. For example, this has been shown for US electricity markets 
[22,23] and Norway [24]. Similar approaches have also been used to evaluate the impact of 
wind power on system equilibrium, both with and without demand response [26,27]. 
 
A long-term approach results in the construction of an electricity system with optimal 
generation capacities. Usually this neglects capacity that is already present in a market, 
assuming that one would divest from overcapacity. As long as the state of the system is not 
taken into account, the long-term equilibrium found remains somewhat theoretical. Energy 
system models take a step further. They often require a high level of detail in representing the 
energy system with existing capacities and cost projections. While they take into account the 
current market structure, they often have extensive computation requirements. Analyses have, 
for example, been carried out with a focus on demand response from residential appliances 
[28], heat pumps [29,30] and electric vehicles [31–33].  
 
In a Danish context, studies on household demand response have mostly been published by 
authorities, the transmission system operator and business organisations [34–37]. While some 
of the studies apply an equilibrium approach, long-term effects on capacity are often 
neglected. In particular manual residential response is mostly modelled as a price-taker. 
Research interest 
Although the literature is quite extensive on the topic of demand response in electricity, a 
couple of issues have not yet been fully addressed. We explore the problem of the long-term 
welfare effect of household demand response in Denmark (a system with large shares of wind 
power) comparing spot pricing and simplified variable rebate products.  
 
Only few scientific works have been published on impacts in Denmark, although the interplay 
with the development of wind power is particularly interesting. In a wind-based system the 
results are expected to be even more distinct and in favour of demand response. Although the 
wind production may reduce the net need for peak power it has a severe impact on the 
required capacity mix. As mentioned above, some studies in the Danish context apply a price-
taker approach and thus neglect the dynamic effect of residential demand response on long-
term market equilibrium. 
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All of the Danish studies above, as well as many of the international ones, evaluate demand 
response at retail level using standard day-ahead spot pricing of electricity. While this may be 
the efficient, and a realistic option, we think that one has to take into account the restrictions 
of individual consumers in reacting to hourly prices manually. Complexity of contracts may 
also inhibit adoption [7]. Therefore, we analyse not only the impact of hourly spot pricing 
schemes, but also investigate the effect of simpler products that are more likely to be adopted 
by household customers, because the customers are better able to oversee the implications of 
the products. 
 
The products analysed reflect structures applied in a field experiment amongst Danish 
electricity consumers. We aim at combining the model with actual results from the 
experiment at a later stage. The products are similar, but not identical, to critical peak pricing 
products analysed in a US context [38].  
 
The field experiment also investigates non-monetary incentives, as for some customer 
segments they potentially represent a more relevant value [39]. If such types of incentives can 
be translated into elasticities, then the developed model may serve as a basis to evaluate the 
benefits of such approaches as well. At this stage, however, this is not yet possible. 
METHOD 
The welfare effect of demand response 
In electricity, as in any other market, households consume as long as their marginal benefit 
exceeds the market price. Yet, to avoid costly real-time metering electricity customers are 
mostly exposed to flat rates reflecting merely the average price level [40]. As a result 
observed electricity demand is mostly inflexible in the short term, i.e. inelastic and not 
responsive to hourly prices. 
 
Actual price elasticity of household electricity consumption may still be different from zero. 
As has been shown in several studies (see Faruqui and Sergici [41] for an overview), 
customers show some extent of elasticity also towards short-term changes in electricity prices. 
But even though demand is elastic, as long as the household rate does not change, demand 
stays the same too. Only if exposed to varying prices one would see varying demand. 
 
On wholesale level electricity prices vary with the marginal costs of the operating production 
plants. If producers reveal their true costs the price outcome minimises total costs. In an 
efficient market the demand side should be exposed to these prices and the market would 
clear where marginal costs equal marginal benefits of the customers as defined by the 
aggregate demand curve. 
 
A market with flat average retail pricing fails to reach efficient wholesale prices that 
correspond to actual marginal benefits [42]. Given their elasticity, customers that see only an 
average retail price consume too much during high wholesale price periods and too little 
during low wholesale price periods. The production, and thus supply costs, would either be 
higher than the actual consumer benefit, or production capacity is left idle although a higher 
benefit could be achieved by producing more. If exposed to the actual market price, demand 
would adjust and ensure the optimal quantity to be produced. Moving from customers on a 
flat rate and not reacting, to customers exposed to actual wholesale prices and becoming able 
to react, will therefore result in a positive welfare effect.  
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The relevant measure for a change in welfare is the net-change in consumer and producer 
surplus [43]. In order to estimate these we construct an hourly model of supply and demand 
and compare the outcomes of different retail price regimes. 
The long-term impact of demand response on capacity  
The above description of the welfare effect of demand response addresses only the short-run 
effect of response, that is, what happens given a certain structure of supply. Optimality is thus 
found only considering marginal costs of production. 
 
In the long run, however, it is possible for producers to adjust their capacities. New entrants 
may join the market, or capacity may be shut down. This process continues until capacity 
reaches a new long-term equilibrium. In this situation, adding additional capacity would result 
in overall losses, while reducing capacity would result in profits attracting new entrants and a 
capacity increase. 
 
Optimal electricity market production capacities can be determined considering their fixed 
and variable costs. Constructing so called screening curves is one concept of determining the 
optimal amounts based on a fixed load duration curve [40]. Having flexible demand 
complicates the process a bit, as every addition of capacity may alter the short-term 
equilibrium and thus the resulting prices that form the basis for long-term revenues. 
 
Intuitively, the impact of demand response with real-time pricing will be to reduce the use of 
expensive peak capacity. This makes it overall less costly to supply customers. Also one gets 
a higher utilisation of low-marginal cost plants, which generates a higher contribution to their 
fixed costs. This situation, however, cannot go on for long, as peak generators would not be 
able to cover their fixed costs, while other generators might generate profits. Some peak 
generators would have to leave the market. While other generators may as well join, the 
structure of supply would still change and result in market prices at new levels. In particular, 
the intuitive results of reduced peak prices will be affected due to the adjustment in capacity. 
 
A further complication in the Danish system is the development of wind power capacity and 
its impact on the revenues of all other generators. The initial tendency of an introduction of 
wind production at practically zero marginal cost is to reduce the frequency and level of price 
peaks, thus lowering overall prices. An impact often referred to as the merit-order effect [44]. 
However, capacity that is not able to cover fixed costs at such reduced price levels will have 
to leave the market resulting in a backlash of prices until a new long-term equilibrium is 
reached. 
 
One might assume that if both wind and demand response affect peak prices in the short term 
similarly, then the effect on long-run capacity would be similar as well, and thus lead to an 
amplification of the effects. Demand response, however, is flexible as opposed to wind 
production. Therefore some of the backlash effect can be expected to be compensated by 
responsive demand, and may be another argument in favour of demand response in a wind 
based system. 
Modelling approach 
The described theoretical framework is implemented in a closed market model, i.e. without 
interconnections to other systems. At first the model generates a short-term equilibrium based 
on a given set of production capacities and demand. The short-term equilibrium condition to 
be fulfilled is that marginal cost equals marginal benefit in each of the simulated hours such 
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that volume supplied equals the volume asked for at the market clearing price. To find the 
equilibrium we need a model of demand and supply curves. These are marginal cost and 
benefit functions based on the characteristics of supply and demand.  
 
On the demand side the determining factor is the price elasticity of demand. It may be defined 
in several ways depending on the underlying model of individual utility [45]. Moreover one 
has to distinguish between elasticity of demand due to price changes of the good itself (own-
price elasticity) and of other goods (cross-price elasticity). Here we focus on own-price 
elasticity. 
 
A traditional good has a decreasing marginal utility to consumers, that is, an additional unit 
consumed will provide less benefit to the consumer as compared to the previous unit. The 
absolute effect of a price change will therefore be different depending on the price level 
previous to the change; i.e. the demand curve is not linear. We use constant elasticities 
defined as the percentage change of quantity Q given a percentage change of the price P to 
take this into account [46]: 
 
𝜀 = 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑
 𝑑
𝑑
 (1) 
 
Our focus lies on the short-term elasticity of electricity demand, which is expressed in 
adjustments along a demand curve that is static within the time horizon analysed. Sometimes 
this is referred to as the real-time price elasticity [47]. We do not consider structural changes 
in electricity demand changes that may occur if the long-term price level encourages new 
investments in appliances producing a permanent change of the short-term demand curve. 
 
Our constant-elasticity demand curves have the form: 
 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝐷0,𝑡 �𝑑𝑡𝑑0�𝜀 (2) 
 
With  
 
Dt: Demand in hour t 
D0,t: Base line demand in hour t 
Pt: Price in hour t 
P0: Anchor price 
ε: Price elasticity 
 
The marginal benefit function is derived from the demand function that incorporates both the 
demand from customers on a flat-rate tariff and customers on a variable tariff such that: 
 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝐷0,𝑡 �𝛼 �𝑑𝑡𝑑0�𝜀 + (1 − α) �𝑑𝑓𝑑0�𝜀� (3) 
 
With additional parameters: 
 
α: Share of customers on variable prices 
Pf: Flat-rate price 
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Rearranging for the price Pt to find the inverse demand function [48], provides us with the 
aggregate marginal benefit function:  
 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝑑0 �1𝛼 � 𝐷𝑡𝐷0,𝑡 − (1 − α) �𝑑𝑓𝑑0�𝜀��
1
𝜀
 (4) 
 
Ensuring that 𝐷𝑡 > 𝐷0,𝑡(1 − α) �𝑃𝑓𝑃0�𝜀, i.e. total demand can never be less than the demand of 
flat-rate customers. 
 
If a share of customers is exposed to spot prices total demand follows this curve. For 
increased elasticity ε and increased share of customers on variable prices α market demand 
becomes more elastic. Figure 1 illustrates the shape of the demand curves at different 
adoption levels of variable prices. While P0 is a fixed anchor price, D0 changes on an hourly 
basis. P0 should be set such that it reflects the efficient level of the flat-rate tariff in the 
reference case. In this case the model yields the load curve D0,t with a 100% share of flat-rate 
customers. 
 
 
Figure 1: Aggregate demand curve for different 
shares of variable price customers 
 
Figure 2: Stylised supply curves with and 
without wind production 
 
To model generation we use a step-wise supply curve. Supply is based on three generic 
technologies: base load, mid-merit, and peak load capacity. The short-term marginal cost 
function is a piecewise linear function such that: 
 
𝑀𝑀 =
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧
𝑚𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏, for 𝑑 < 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝑘�𝑑 − 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏� + 𝑚𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏, for 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 ≤ 𝑑 < 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 + 𝑚𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚−𝑚𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑘
𝑚𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚 , for 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 + 𝑚𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚−𝑚𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑘 ≤ 𝑑 < 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑘�𝑑 − 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑚𝑚𝑚�+ 𝑚𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚 , for 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑑 < 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝑚𝑐𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑝−𝑚𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘
𝑚𝑐𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑘, for 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝑚𝑐𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑝−𝑚𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘 ≤ 𝑑 < 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑘
𝑘�𝑑 − 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑘�+ 𝑚𝑐𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑘, for 𝑑 ≥ 𝑀𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑘
 (5) 
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With 
 
Q: Quantity supplied 
Cagg,base/mid/peak: Aggregated installed capacity 
mcbase/mid/peak: Marginal costs 
k: Slope at steps 
 
A computational difficulty occurs at the shift of one technology to the next, as well as when 
demand exceeds supply capacity. In theory the factor k, representing the slope between steps, 
has an infinite value. In order to be able to determine equilibrium prices at any point, and to 
ensure that the market clears in every case, we avoid fully vertical curves by applying steep 
slopes. Practically, the slopes are vertical; they enable us, however, to determine finite price 
spikes without having to set a price cap. We can interpret the minor additional capacity as 
emergency generation that may be utilised during short periods of time [40].  
 
Calculating a short-term equilibrium applying the above supply and demand curves results in 
a set of hourly prices that, in combination with their respective cost structures, determines 
producers’ revenues. On the other hand, these prices are the basis for the retail rate customers 
are charged. 
 
To establish a long-run equilibrium producers leave and enter the market until all profits go to 
zero. This includes profits to retailers. Consumers will therefore pay a price that exactly 
covers whole-sale procurement costs of their suppliers. 
 
As a benchmark we first establish an equilibrium without customer response; that is, all 
customers are on a constant flat-rate tariff with no incentive to change their behaviour. By 
switching shares of customers to variable prices, demand in all of the hours changes 
according to the price elasticity of demand. 
 
A change in consumption affects producer revenues. In order to fulfil the equilibrium 
condition of zero profits will therefore require to adjust capacities until we reach a new long-
term equilibrium state.  
 
Following this procedure makes it possible to assess the impact of the customers’ response 
reacting upon a constant price elasticity. This will not exactly resemble the real world, but it 
provides us with an initial estimation of the economic demand response potential by deriving 
the relative supply costs and welfare estimates at different long-term equilibria (i.e. with and 
without the variable pricing scheme).  
Simplified retail products 
In order to better reflect the expected impact from household demand response we adjust the 
price structures that customers are exposed to. As stated above simplified product structures 
might be more realistic to be adopted by households. Furthermore, even though a customer 
may adopt and be exposed to hourly prices, other restrictions may prevent an optimal 
response pattern. 
 
The product used in this step reflects a structure used in a field experiment conducted at the 
time of writing. The experiment applies a premium paid for shifted volumes (i.e. a rebate). 
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The complication with a time-shift rebate relates to that we want to reward only volumes 
shifted – payments for all other volumes stay the same.  
 
To settle such a product we need to establish a baseline that we can measure the shift against. 
In principle using cross-price elasticities would be an option to model the demand in one time 
period dependent on the demand in another and vice versa. However, we can simplify the 
problem by concentrating on one of the time periods only, and use the ordinary own-price 
elasticity in combination with the marginal value. We can as well use the own-price elasticity 
in the other period to adjust demand in the opposite direction. In practice this is a useful 
approach, because we are most interested in one of the periods – typically the peak – when 
there is a risk of insufficient supply. 
 
Modelling the appropriate price level is another issue. As the program is defined as a rebate 
for every unit shifted (either upwards or downwards), this needs to be reflected in the price. 
We must assume that the price otherwise is the flat rate. We also assume a fixed rebate as a 
percentage of the flat rate. 
 
The aim of the price structure in our case is to be able to dynamically react upon system 
conditions. Therefore the rebate will depend on the difference between the average price and 
the price during a predefined critical period. Now if spot prices show a sufficiently large price 
difference between the critical program period and the remainder of the day, then the rebate 
gets triggered. That means, during the rebate period the customer has to pay the flat rate for 
the full volume consumed minus the rebate times the difference between his consumption and 
the baseline. 
 
The relevant marginal benefit for the customers depends on whether they are provided with an 
incentive to increase or to reduce consumption. If spot prices during the rebate period are 
higher than average, customers should reduce their consumption and the relevant marginal 
price will be the flat rate plus the rebate. In the opposite case the relevant marginal price is the 
flat rate minus the rebate. 
Assumptions 
We apply the model using preliminary inputs to derive illustrative results. As a starting point 
we use historic demand profiles and wind profiles. These determine base case prices and 
costs.  
 
We use fixed and variable costs for three stylised thermal generation technologies as shown in 
Table 1. As the baseline demand we use the aggregate 2012 consumption of all Danish 
customers not settled on an hourly basis [49]; that is, customers with an annual consumption 
of less than 100 MWh. The price elasticity of demand is a crucial input. We use -0.1 as a 
starting point in line with previous publications [9,47,50]. 
 
Table 1: Input costs of stylised generation technologies 
  Base load Mid merit Peak load 
Annual fixed cost EUR/MW 150,000 75,000 50,000 
Variable cost EUR/MWh 15 35 60 
 
The parameters of the rebate pricing scheme are defined to reflect values used in the field 
experiment. During the experiment customers will only be asked to shift volumes relative to a 
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time window of three hours. Shifted volumes generate a rebate of 50% of the retail price. A 
signal to customers is triggered whenever the price level within the defined time window 
differs from the daily average price with more than 10%. This threshold is built in to ensure 
that the response generates sufficient value at wholesale level. While the rebate is fixed, the 
wholesale price differences vary every day; so this is a parameter that needs to be optimised 
by the retailer eventually. 
RESULTS 
With our approach we calculate both the short-term and the long-term equilibrium. This 
provides us with the possibility of comparing both these effects of demand response. 
 
We first look at a spot pricing scheme for retail customers. In the modelled market setting this 
is the ideal pricing option and thus yields the most favourable results. The effect of two 
different levels of adoption of such a scheme is shown in Figure 3. For most of the year 
demand increases, while it decreases only during a shorter peak period. 
 
 
Figure 3: Long-term equilibrium load duration curves 
 
The welfare effect of the analysed incentives is determined by the change in consumer and 
producer surpluses. With traditional price elasticities of demand, the demand curve is not 
linear and it is therefore not possible to determine an absolute value for the consumer benefit. 
What we can measure, however, is the change in consumer surplus from an option with all 
costumers on fixed prices to the new option with variable prices. 
 
As shown by Borenstein and Holland [25] the change in welfare caused by a switch of 
customers to variable prices depends on the change in consumer surplus while generator and 
retailer profits stay the same. The producer surplus is defined by the difference between costs 
and revenues. In long-term equilibrium revenues exactly cover fixed costs and the surplus is 
at zero. Due to retail market competition retailer profits will be driven down to zero as well. 
 
To derive the welfare effect we can therefore use the following expression per time step t:  
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∆𝑊𝑡 = 𝛼 𝐷0,𝑡  P0 − Pt (PtP0)εε + 1 + (𝛼 − 1) 𝐷0,𝑡  P0 − Pf (PfP0)εε + 1  (6) 
 
Although not a welfare indicator, the direct cost impact on consumers is an immediate 
concern of policy makers and it is therefore relevant to extract from the results. It is not just 
relevant here to look at the responsive customers, but also to include the conservative 
customers in the analysis of effects. 
 
It is particularly relevant here to distinguish between short-term and long-term effects. In the 
short-term customers will be able to significantly reduce their bill by reducing their peak 
consumption and potentially shifting it to lower-priced hours. Table 2 shows clearly how the 
customers may immediately gain from responding to variable prices. It is not even required 
for all customers to switch in order to find substantial gains of around 25% on both costs and 
consumer surplus. A small change in demand at peak times will have a large price effect and 
this should also result in much lower prices for passive flat-rate customers. 
 
Table 2: Short-term effects of spot pricing 
 Costs Average retail price Change in welfare 
 Total Flat Variable Total Absolute Relative to 
original costs 
 EUR EUR/MWh EUR/MWh EUR/MWh EUR % 
100% flat pricing 635,202,914 40.38 NA 40.38 0 0.00% 
20% spot pricing 491,350,478 30.45 29.57 30.27 159,836,039 25.16% 
100% spot pricing 483,604,857 NA 29.4 29.4 168,442,285 26.52% 
 
The reduction in peak prices has an impact on the revenue of peak suppliers. They will not 
earn a sufficient return to pay for the fixed costs. Thus one must expect capacity to be 
reduced, which in turn increases prices. These adjustment processes have to be taken into 
account in the longer run as they significantly reduce expected gains. 
 
The effect of capacity adjustments in the long run are striking. As can be seen in Table 3 
supply costs to customers in a long run equilibrium with all customers reacting to spot prices, 
at the given elasticity, results in a change in consumer surplus of about 7.55% − significantly 
lower than what could be expected if only looking at the new short term equilibrium.  
 
Table 3: Long-term effects of spot pricing 
 Costs Average retail price Change in welfare 
 Total Flat Variable Total Absolute Relative to 
original costs 
 EUR EUR/MWh EUR/MWh EUR/MWh EUR % 
100% flat pricing 635,202,914 40.38 NA 40.38 0 0.00% 
20% spot pricing 623,626,381 40.46 34.73 39.27 12,862,814 2.02% 
100% spot pricing 592,035,616 NA 36.05 36.05 47,963,665 7.55% 
 
A central result of previous analyses is that a switch of customers to real-time pricing makes 
all customers better off. It has been formally shown how the flat rate to remaining retail 
customers decreases to prevent retailer profits in the long-run equilibrium [25]. The intuitive 
explanation of this result is that the efficient retail rate is equal to the volume-weighted 
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average wholesale prices. Customers on variable pricing schemes reduce peak prices, at times 
when demand is usually high. Our results show, however, that in a system with high shares of 
variable production this argument does not hold necessarily. While demand response 
customers still reduce price peaks, such peaks must not in any case coincide with highest 
demands. Therefore it may be the case that retailer costs to supply flat-rate customers are not 
reduced in the expected way. 
 
Another effect worth noting is that while in the short term a small share of responsive 
customers is sufficient to generate substantial savings, further increases become more 
important in the longer run. The difference between 20% and 100% on variable pricing is 
more significant in the long-term than in the short-term results. 
 
Although decreased, the long-term results are still significant. Moving from this ideal scheme 
to simplified pricing will have to reduce the effect. The question is, though, whether the 
reduction is within an acceptable range. 
 
Unfortunately the rebate pricing scheme as used in the field experiment only covers a daily 
three-hour period. Therefore effects are rather limited and it is difficult to draw final 
conclusions. What can be observed from Table 4 is a substantial reduction of the economic 
effect already in the short term. 
 
A long-term equilibrium is not easily established for the rebate pricing scheme. As for other 
averaging variable-pricing schemes, like for example time-of-use pricing, convergence is not 
guaranteed [22]; a definite equilibrium has not been determined. However, already from the 
short-term figures it can be concluded that the gain in consumer surplus should be sufficient 
to more than compensate for the welfare losses on the production side. So the rebate schemes 
can be expected to have a positive welfare effect in the long run as well. 
 
Table 4: Short-term effect of rebate pricing scheme 
 Costs Average retail price Change in welfare 
 Total Flat Variable Total Absolute Relative to 
original costs 
 EUR EUR/MWh EUR/MWh EUR/MWh EUR % 
100% flat pricing 635,202,914 40.38 NA 40.38 0 0.00% 
20% rebate pricing 634,940,794 40.38 40.28 40.36 294,766 0.05% 
100% rebate pricing 634,223,629 NA 40.30 40.30 1,474,055 0.23% 
DISCUSSION 
The model presented above provides indications of how demand response affects welfare in a 
system with high shares of wind power. To keep the model flexible and enable testing of 
different pricing structures we limited its complexity and left out a couple of conditions. In 
the following we briefly discuss how these may affect results. 
 
The model uses a simplified representation of production capacities, only incorporating the 
major categories of plants. Using a more detailed model of plants may provide more accurate 
numerical results. The general conclusions, however, would stay the same. In practice 
generators would have more technical restrictions limiting their flexibility. In Denmark, for 
example, combined heat and power production is an important factor. Such restrictions of 
plant flexibility are expected to add to the value of demand response. 
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The most substantial concern may be that we look at a closed economy and don’t allow for 
other sources of flexibility to react upon prices. This would clearly reduce the economic 
benefit of these kinds of pricing schemes, because the flat-rate benchmark will not have such 
extreme price spikes as we see them in the model. It could still be argued that for political 
reasons from a national perspective production capacities should still be held available, even 
though peak demand is covered by interconnection capacities with neighbouring countries. 
The capacity will then be idle at peak times and would not gain scarcity rents as in the model. 
They would still have to be financed, though, so the costs would have to be covered by 
consumers. In that case however, demand response could not directly avoid the costs. 
 
One might as well object that the model is based on hourly values. While it may be possible 
to increase the time granularity of the model this also needs to take into account the special 
characteristics of electricity markets at such time scales. Modelling the technical restrictions 
at this level is considered of limited relevance for the analysis at hand, though. It could be 
considered to include a reserve to handle short-term deviations below the hour. As long as 
customers are inelastic below the one-hour timeframe this will constitute a fixed cost, and 
thus not be relevant for the results. If one suggests that household demand response is able to 
provide regulating power it would be relevant to include such aspects in a model. It would 
require automation of some of the households' equipment. This may be an option, but would 
require a different kind of modelling. 
 
An issue that is a clear limitation is that we only take into account the system as a whole. As 
stated above, grid congestions may very well occur locally. These have a different cost 
structure and would have a quite different impact on the analysis. This should be very much 
in favour of demand response, though. 
CONCLUSION 
Flexibility of the demand side is an element that is prominently placed in the political debate 
on smart energy systems. Our calculations show that it can be a helpful and valuable strategy. 
It is important, however, to keep in mind the extent of what small consumers are able to 
contribute with manually. The ideal case with elastic demand reacting to real-time price 
signals is likely to be limited to automatically controllable loads that can be shifted without 
any loss of comfort to the consumer. Traditional household demand, although subject to some 
elasticity, is more likely to contribute via simplified signals like the ones used in the 
aforementioned field experiment. 
 
The illustrative results above show that, although the ideal case produces significant benefits 
of around 7% in a new long-term equilibrium, the effects of the simplified structures are 
clearly limited. Simplification may be necessary to enable the adoption of new variable tariff 
schemes. But it may as well make a promising instrument less effective. The design of the 
applied rebate structure can certainly be improved. Deliberate contract design for demand 
response considering both adoption and effectiveness will be essential for households to make 
a significant contribution to power system flexibility. 
 
The model also shows that short-term gains can be large; but policy-makers should note that 
these gains are merely temporary. The timing of long-term over short-term effects is an 
interesting aspect that requires further research. Harvesting the short-term gains could become 
an interesting incentive for first-movers if the long-term dynamics are relatively slow. In an 
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interconnected system the advantage of flexible demand in one market may still be substantial 
as long as the remaining markets stay inflexible. 
 
The method we used is based on a formal economic model of demand. One might object that 
this does not properly reflect the behaviour of household electricity customers. The initiated 
field experiment will address some of these behavioural issues. In future work we aim at 
incorporating the economics of such effects in a similar setting. By coupling the model with 
results from the field experiments we expect to derive welfare effects from different levels of 
incentives, and could propose appropriate product design.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
Dt: Demand in hour t 
D0,t: Base line demand in hour t 
Pt: Price in hour t 
P0: Anchor price 
ε: Price elasticity 
α: Share of customers on variable prices 
Pf: Flat-rate price 
Q: Quantity supplied 
Cagg,base/mid/peak: Aggregated installed capacity 
mcbase/mid/peak: Marginal costs 
k: Slope at steps 
∆Wt: Change in welfare 
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